Employment contracts give a principal the authority to decide exibly which task his agent should execute. However, there is a tradeoff, rst pointed out by Simon (1951), between exibility and employer moral hazard. An employment contract allows the principal to adjust the task quickly to the realization of the state of the world, but he may also abuse this exibility to exploit the agent. We capture this tradeoff in an experimental design and show that principals exhibit a strong preference for the employment contract. However, sel sh principals exploit agents in one-shot interactions, inducing the latter to resist entering into employment contracts. This resistance to employment contracts vanishes if fairness preferences in combination with reputation opportunities keep principals from abusing their power, leading to the widespread, endogenous formation of ef cient long-run employment relations. Our results inform the theory of the rm by showing how behavioral forces shape an important transaction cost of integration -the abuse of authority -and by providing an empirical basis for assessing differences between the Marxian and the Coasian view of the rm, as well as Alchian and Demsetz's (1972) critique of the Coasian approach. (JEL: C91, D23, D86)
